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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
PROSECUTION OF GENDER-BASED 
CRIMES—THE SPECIAL COURT FOR 
SIERRA LEONE EXPERIENCE 
 
REMARKS BY HON. TERESA DOHERTY,  
JUSTICE OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE* 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up following a request by the 
Government of Sierra Leone to the United Nations after a civil war that 
raged in that small West African country for ten years.1  The war was noted 
for the brutality of the atrocities visited upon civilians, killing by beating 
and burning, the deliberate chopping off of arms, hands, and legs, the 
abduction of people for forced labor, as sex slaves, and as child soldiers, 
pregnant women cut open to settle bets about the sex of their babies, and 
the deliberate destruction of homes, villages, and cities.2 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is noted for several landmark 
decisions in International Law, including the decision on the immunity of a 
                                                           
 *  The views in this paper are entirely those of the writer and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Special Court for Sierra Leone or Trial Chamber II.  Hon 
Justice T.A. Doherty, C.B.E., is from Northern Ireland.  Before studying law in Belfast, 
she worked as a civil servant and as a volunteer in Zambia, and worked in legal aid 
clinics in “no go areas” of Belfast as a student in early 1970.  She worked in Papua 
New Guinea from 1976-1987, first in the Public Solicitor’s (public defense) office and 
as provincial legal officer for Morobe Province.  While Provincial legal officer she 
continued to do legal aid work and made several Constitutional rights challenges in the 
courts.  She was the first woman to be elected as a councilor of the Papua New Guinea 
Law Society.  She was appointed as the Principal Magistrate for the Momase region of 
Papua New Guinea in 1987 and as National and later Supreme Court judge in 1988, the 
first woman to hold any high judicial office in the South Pacific Islands Region  She 
was appointed a judge of the High Court and Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone in 2003.  
She was appointed by United Nations in Jan 2005 as a judge of the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone and is the presiding judge of Trial Chamber II.  She is a commissioner for 
Life Sentence Review Commission for Northern Ireland, part time chairman of Appeal 
Services, member of the Commonwealth Reference Group for the promotion of the 
Rights of Women and the Girl Child and has worked on consultancies in various 
countries in Africa and Asia. 
 1. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone 
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone]. 
 2. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, 
Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. 
SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, (June 20, 2007). 
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Head of State,3 on the application of amnesties in peace treaties to crimes 
against humanity and war crimes,4 and the recruitment and use of children 
in war (commonly referred to as child soldiers).5  My emphasis in this 
Paper will be on the decisions relating to sexual slavery and forced 
marriage. 
The Statute6 setting up the Court was charged to prosecute persons who 
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law since November 30, 1996.  The 
Statute provided that the court would have power to prosecute crimes 
against humanity and, for the first time, sexual slavery was specified as a 
crime against humanity at Article 2(g).7  As a hybrid court, the Statute of 
the court also incorporated domestic law of Sierra Leone.  This included, 
inter alia, offences relating to the abuse of girls pursuant to the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Children Act 1926 (CAP.31).  No persons were charged under 
this Sierra Leonean Law. 
THE INDICTMENTS 
A total of thirteen indictments were proferred against thirteen men and of 
these the indictments against the nine individuals associated, variously, 
with the Civil Defence Force, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, and 
Revolutionary United Front were presented at the same time.  These were 
later consolidated into three cases and were commonly referred to as the 
CDF, the ARFC, and the RUF trials.  The AFRC indictees, Brima, Kamara, 
and Kanu, were arraigned on various dates, prior to the consolidation, 
between March and September 2003. 
The initial charges brought by the Prosecution against the individuals 
who were later to be tried in the AFRC and RUF cases included allegations 
of sexual violence.  In contrast, the Prosecution included no charges of 
sexual violence whatsoever in its initial indictments against the three 
individuals who would later be tried together in the CDF case.  I do not 
know the reasons for this. 
In February 2004, the Prosecution sought leave to amend its Indictments 
to, inter alia, “add one more and new count of forced marriage,” a crime 
against humanity in all three consolidated cases.  Two of the indictments 
already included charges of sexual violence while one, the CDF, did not.  
In seeking to add the forced marriage charges to the two cases that already 
                                                           
 3. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I-059, Decision on Immunity 
from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004). 
 4. See Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on 
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty 
Provided by the Lomé Accord (May 25, 2004). 
 5. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on 
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (May 31, 
2004). 
 6. Statue of the Special Court of Sierra Leona, app. of Agreement on the 
Establishment of a Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra note 1, 2178 U.N.T.S. at 145. 
 7. Statute of the Special Court, supra note 6, art. 1. 
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included other allegations of sexual violence, the Prosecution argued that 
the additional charge they were seeking to enter—forced marriage—was 
based on the “exact same factual context” pleaded in earlier indictments 
and therefore that the Defence would not need to undertake further 
investigations to contest this new count in the indictment.  The Defence 
objected arguing forced marriage was not a crime against humanity and 
such a charge violated the principles of legality.8  After a lengthy review of 
the principles, in particular “the crucial consideration” of “timing and 
whether the application for the amendment is brought at the stage in the 
proceedings where it would not prejudice the rights of the accused,” the 
Trial Chamber by a majority allowed the Prosecution to amend its 
indictments in the two cases, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and 
the Revolutionary United Front, to include charges of forced marriage.  The 
Trial Chamber also held that forced marriage was a “kindred offence” to 
those that existed in consolidated indictment9 and referred to “the necessity 
for international criminal justice to highlight the high profile nature of the 
emerging domain of gender offences with a view to bringing the alleged 
perpetrators to justice.”10 
In its decision in the Civil Defense Forces case, the majority of the Trial 
Chamber considered the impact of adding an entirely new set of charges, 
involving a completely new set of facts, on the rights of the accused to be 
tried without undue delay and held that allowing the Prosecution to add 
new facts and counts at such a late date would have delayed the start of 
tria1.11 
In his minority opinion, Justice Boutet referred to the Special Court’s 
own Rules, the reluctance of victims of sexual violence to come forward 
and report such actions, the reports of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of the systematic rape, 
sexual slavery, and slavery—like practices during periods of armed 
conflicts and the rulings of the other ad hoc Tribunals in support of his 
opinion that leave to amend the indictment should be granted.12 
It appears that the Trial Chamber in the recent case of Prosecutor v. 
Lukić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
when asked to amend an indictment to add new charges of rape, 
enslavement and torture was faced with a similar dilemma to that of the 
judges in the CDF case.13 
                                                           
 8. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on 
Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 6, 12, 88 (May 6, 2004). 
 9. Id. ¶¶ 46, 52. 
 10. Id. ¶ 34. 
 11. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, 
Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment (May 20, 2004). 
 12. See Prosecutor v. Normam, Fofana, & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pierre Boutet on the Decision on Prosecution Request for 
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 26-34 (May 31, 2004). 
 13. See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Motion 
Seeking Leave to Amend the Second Amended Indictment (July 8, 2008). 
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Balancing the rights of the various parties is a discretionary matter, and, 
possibly other chambers may have lent more weight to the Prosecution’s 
explanations for the delays in bringing charges of sexual violence in the 
CDF trial.  However, the rights of the accused to a trial without undue 
delay is clearly articulated in the Special Court Statute as well as numerous 
human rights instruments that preceded it.  In my view the sexual nature of 
the new charges had nothing to do with the CDF and Lukić trial decisions 
to deny the Prosecution applications to amend the impugned indictments, 
the same principles would have applied equally to any criminal charge. 
THE DECISIONS 
Trial Chamber II, of which I was a judge, heard and ruled on the 
evidence in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu (the AFRC trial).  That 
decision considered, for the first time, the international criminal law 
relating to child soldiers, forced marriage and sexual slavery.  For the 
purposes of this paper I look at forced marriage and sexual slavery. 
FORCED MARRIAGE 
In the course of the civil war two rebel groups, the Revolutionary United 
Front and the Armed Forced Revolutionary Council regularly abducted 
civilians and used them for forced labor such as mining, domestic work, 
and carrying of loads, and women and girls for sexual purposes. 
Those women and girls who were forcefully abducted from their homes 
were taken back to the rebel camps and fighters could select those women 
and girls they wanted as wives.  Commanders got the first choice.  Very 
young girls were sometimes allocated to young SBU (small boy unit) 
fighters.  A bureaucratic system of registering the names and allocation of 
these women was instituted in some camps and fighters were obliged to 
sign for the women or girls allocated to them as wives.  The captors 
sometimes kept those women or girls they captured themselves.  The 
woman was told she was the wife of the captor or fighter.  She was given 
no choice in the matter. 
Both the Prosecution and Defense adduced expert evidence.  The expert 
evidence by both parties showed that customary arranged marriage was and 
still is, a common phenomena in the rural areas throughout West Africa; 
less so in the urban areas.  Girls were and are frequently married or had 
marriages arranged when they were quite young and got little say in who 
they would marry.  Whilst the Muslim religion (the majority religious 
group in Sierra Leone) did not allow for women being married without 
their consent, it was apparent from the expert evidence that many girls were 
and are obliged for the good of the clan or the community to conform with 
the choice made by their elders.  There was consent, albeit a reluctant 
consent or one that was made for the good of the community, rather than 
for the good of the individual. The vital element is the consent of the 
families of the prospective spouses. 
The majority of the Trial Chamber in the AFRC trial, having heard the 
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evidence decided that the facts were not a basis for a separate crime of “so 
called forced marriage” but that it was subsumed into the crime of sexual 
slavery.  Sexual slavery is a separate crime provided for in Article 2(g) of 
the Statute of the Special Court as a Crime against Humanity. 
I dissented from the majority view.  The evidence showed that women 
and girls who were made into wives had a conjugal status forced upon 
them.  They were immediately stigmatized as “bush wives” or “rebel 
wives” they were considered “tainted” by “rebel blood” and were refused 
re-entry into their village communities or their family homes.  Their 
children were stigmatized and, as one expert described it, were running 
naked without an education or future.  The women were obliged to care for 
and carry the “husband’s” possessions, clean, cook and be loyal, and 
provide sex when and as the “husband” wanted.  They had children and 
often suffered miscarriages; diseases and HIV/Aids were common.  Any 
transgressions were severely punished and a “husband” who tired of his 
wife could replace her and might send her to the front line as a fighter.  
However, being a wife of a fighter brought with it certain protections.  The 
wife was protected from rape by other men, given food when food was 
available and depending on the status of the “husband” had a corresponding 
status; to the extent that evidence showed that some wives of commanders 
were responsible for the distribution of looted goods. 
The label “wife” to a rebel caused mental trauma, stigmatized the 
victims and negatively impacted on their ability to re-integrate into the 
communities. 
In approaching the evidence and the submissions of the parties I looked 
to the international customary law and internationally recognized norms 
and standards because, as stated by Professor Werle: 
As part of the international order, international criminal law originated 
from the same legal sources as international law.  These include 
international treaties, customary international law, and general principles 
of law recognized by the world’s major legal systems.  Decisions of 
international courts and international legal doctrine can be used not as 
sources of law, but subsidiary means for determining the law.  Decisions 
of national courts which apply international law can also be referred to 
here.14 
This led to taking account of the Penal Laws of other countries in 
Islamic, Christian, Hindu, Common Law, and Civil Law systems.  
However, more importantly the International Treaties and Conventions 
were applied; in particular the International Covenants such as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
which Sierra Leone signed on September 21, 1988 and ratified in 
November 1988. 
However, it was also relevant in the circumstances and facts of the case 
                                                           
 14. GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 44-45 (2005). 
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to look particularly at the African Charters and Conventions such as the 
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the protocols 
to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa both of which had 
been signed (but not implemented by Sierra Leone).  On the basis of those 
conventions and on the evidence, I held that 
international treaties and domestic law provide that a marriage is a 
relationship founded on the mutual consent of both spouses.  In forced 
marriage the consent of the victim is absent.  In the absence of such 
consent, the victim is forced into a relationship of a conjugal nature with 
the perpetrator thereby subsuming the victim’s will and undermining the 
victim’s exercise of their rights to self determination. 
Further that forced marriage did not necessarily involve elements of 
physical violence such as abduction, enslavement or rape and the fact that 
many women accepted their lot and remained with their “husbands” 
because they had no other choice did not transform a forced marriage into a 
consensual situation and did not retro-actively negate the original 
criminality of the act. 
The Prosecution appealed the Majority Decision and the Appeal 
Chamber reviewed the evidence and the majority and minority opinions.  
The Appeal Chamber noted that “the Prosecution may have misled the 
Trial Chamber by the manner in which forced marriage appeared to have 
been classified in the Indictment.  The Indictment classifies Count 8 “Other 
Inhumane Acts” along with Counts 6, 7, and 9 under the heading “Sexual 
Violence.”  This categorization of forced marriages explains, but does not 
justify, the classification by the Trial Chamber of forced marriage as 
“sexual violence.” 
After reviewing the history of “other inhumane acts” in International 
Criminal Law first introduced in the Nuremburg Charter, the Appeal 
Chamber held that the category “other inhumane acts” was intended to be a 
residual provision so as to punish criminal acts not specifically recognized 
as crimes against humanity but which, in context, are of comparable gravity 
to the listed crimes against humanity.” 
After considering the evidence and the law, the Appeal Chamber held 
that the perpetrator intended to impose a forced conjugal association rather 
than exercise mere ownership over civilian women and girls.  They adopted 
the view in the dissenting opinion that forced marriage involves “the 
imposition, by threat or physical force arising from the perpetrator’s words 
or other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the perpetrator over 
the victims.”  And 
[v]ictims were subjected to mental trauma by being labelled as rebel 
“wives”; further they were stigmatised and found it difficult to integrate 
into their communities . . . causing mental and moral suffering, which in 
the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, is of comparable seriousness to 
other crimes against humanity listed in the Statute.15 
                                                           
15 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals 
Judgment, ¶ 193 (Feb. 22, 2008). 
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The Appeal Chamber then considered whether forced marriage satisfies 
the elements of “other inhumane acts” and held that other inhumane acts 
contained in Article 2(i) of the Statute forms part of Customary 
International Law: 
serves as a residual category designed to punish acts or omissions not 
specifically listed as crimes against humanity provided these acts or 
omissions meet the following requirements: 
Inflict great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health; 
Are sufficiently similar in gravity to the acts referred to in Article 
2(a) to Article 2(h) of the Statute; and 
The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established the character of the gravity of the act. 
The acts must also satisfy the general chapeau requirements of 
crimes against humanity. 
The Appeal Chamber stated that it was “firmly of the view that acts of 
forced marriage were of similar gravity to several enumerated crimes 
against humanity including enslavement, imprisonment, torture, rape, 
sexual slavery and sexual violence.” 
SEXUAL SLAVERY 
Statute Article 2(g) empowers the Special Court to prosecute persons 
who committed the crime of sexual slavery as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against any civilian population.  The crime of sexual 
slavery was described in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia in the Kunarac case.  The Statute of International Criminal 
Court, Art 7 (1)g-2, defined the crime of sexual slavery as: 
The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a 
similar deprivation of liberty. 
The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more 
acts of a sexual nature. 
The perpetrator committed such conduct intending to engage in the act of 
sexual slavery or in the reasonable knowledge that it was likely to occur. 
We adopted that definition and held: 
The powers of ownership listed in the first element of sexual slavery are 
non- exhaustive.  There is no requirement for any payment or exchange 
in order to establish the exercise of ownership.  Deprivation of liberty 
may include extracting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to 
servile status.  Further, ownership, as indicated by possession, does not 
require confinement to a particular place but may include situations in 
which those who are captured remain in the control of their captors 
because they have no where else to go and fear for their lives.  The 
consent or free will of the victim is absent under conditions of 
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enslavement.16 
The facts showed that the women and girls forcefully abducted from 
their homes and communities by rebels were taken back to the rebel bases 
and forcefully marched from one base to another as the rebels moved 
through Sierra Leone.  Some of the women and girls were sent for training 
in military tactics and fighting and sent to the front line, some as described, 
were forced into marriage and may not have been obliged to fight.  Those 
women and girls who were not “wives” were available to all and any 
fighter as sexual objects.  They were frequently raped and frequently gang-
raped, they had no right to resist and could not escape. 
They were obliged to perform domestic duties including cooking, 
laundering, and food finding.  Food finding involved looting food from 
villages and farms as well as looking for food in the bush.  Resistance or 
attempts to escape were met with severe punishment and, particularly in 
cases of attempted escape, with death. 
Evidence was adduced of women being locked in rice boxes, wooden 
boxes used for storing food, and/or being lashed.  The descriptions of the 
forced marches when women were pregnant, sick, and in one case giving 
birth to triplets, showed very severe maltreatment as part of the slavery and 
sexual slavery of these women. 
All three of the Accused in the AFRC trial were convicted of sexual 
slavery, however, not as originally indicted.  Count 7 of the Indictment 
which charged the defendants with “sexual slavery and other forms of 
sexual violence” was dismissed by the majority of the Trial Chamber as 
offending the Rule against duplicity.  The majority ruled that “Count 7 is 
bad for duplicity and is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.” 
I disagreed with the majority in this procedural ruling and held for 
reasons detailed in the judgment that part of the Count which charged the 
defendants with “other forms of sexual violence” should have been severed 
and the evidence relating to sexual slavery only considered. 
The appeal by the Prosecution against the majority ruling was upheld by 
the Appeals Chamber which held the Count should have been severed. 
In a May 11, 2007 article, Louise Arbour, then the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, when writing about the plight of the 
victims of sexual attacks during conflicts stated that: 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has made strides in addressing such 
hindrances in the face of a monumental task; as the result of ten years of 
conflict and the belligerents’ methods of warfare in that country, the 
brutality of sexual violence was extraordinary, and its victims were to be 
counted in the thousands.17 
 
                                                           
 16. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamaru & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, 
¶ 709 (June 20, 2007). 
17 Louise Arbour, War Crimes Against Women Go on with Impunity, TORONTO 
STAR, May 11, 2007, at A15. 
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